Assuming the existence of a secure probabilistic encryption scheme, we show that every language that admits an interactive proof admits a (computational) zero-knowledge interactive proof. This result extends the result of Goldreich, MiCali and Wigderson, that, under the same assumption, all of NP admits zero-knowledge interactive proofs. Assuming envelopes for bit commitment, we show t h t every language that admits an interactive proof admits a perfect zero-knowledge interactive proof.
Introduction
Suppose Bob is polynomially time-bounded, but Alice has unlimited computational resources. If q5 is a satisfiable boolean formula, Alice can certainly convince Bob of this fact; she could send Bob a message y describing a satisfying truth assignment for 4, and Bob could check that y does indeed specify a satisfying truth assignment. In other words, the language L of satisfiable boolean formulas is in NP.
The interaction between Alice and Bob in this example is very simple: Alice sends a single message to Bob, and no other messages are sent between the two. If q5 is satisfiable, there is some message y that Alice might send which will convince Bob to accept. But if q5 is not satisfiable, then no message that Alice might send w i l l convince Bob to accept.
In the paper of Goldwasser, Micdi, and Rackoff [GMR] , the authors extend the scenario above in two ways, to arrive at the notion of an interactive proof f o r the language L. First, the interaction between Alice and Bob is allowed to be more complicated, with Alice and Bob exchanging multiple messages. Secondly, Alice and Bob are taken t o be probabilistic, and Bob may occasionally accept or reject erroneously. It is required that if an input is in L, then Alice can behave in such a way that Bob will almost always accept; but if an input is n o t in L , then, no mater what messages Alice sends, Bob will almost certainly reject.
A different notion of provability "beyond NP" was independently proposed by Babai [Bab] . This notion is called an Arthur-Merlin protocol. Babai's model is similar to that of [GMR] , but is seemingly more limited, because the verifier is required to reveal to the prover all of his coin flips (right after making them). Though this loss of privacy seems an important restriction, Goldwasser and Sipser [GSJ show that, in fact, the models are equivalent with respect to language recognition.
Let IP be the class of languages that admit interactive proofs. Clearly N P 5 I P , for an NP-interaction is a special type of IF'-interaction, in which the prover (Alice) sends the one and only message, and t h e verifier (Bob) never errs. However, IP may be a much larger class of languages. For example, there is a n interactive proof known for graph nonisomorphism, even though there are not known t o be succinct certificates for establishing that a pair of graphs are not isomorphic.
Overview of the construction
We wish to show that, if ( P -V ) is a n interactive proof system for the language L, then P and V can be modified t o P' a n d V', such that (P' H V') is an interactive proof system for L, but P' U zero-knowledge ooer L.
Suppose (P++ v) is a n interactive proof system for the language L. We would like to carry out the "same interaction" in a way that betrays essentially no information to V. To d o this, we could have P encrypt each message that it sends to V. That is, P uses a secure encryption function, E . On the i t h round, when P "would have" sent to V the string yi, P instead sends to v the string E ( y i , di), a random encryption of y;. ( We assume that E ( s , s) = E ( y , t ) implies 3 = y, and that from E(z,s) and s one can efficiently compute I. Security is with respect t o nonuniform poly-time computation.)
There are two immediate difficulties. First, how can V be expected to compute his responses to P , since he doesn't understand what P has sent? Second, how can V be convinced t o accept the string I if, as far as he can tell, P has sent him complete gibberish?
The first problem-that V won't know what to do with the messages he's received-is answered as follows. By the result of Goldwasser and Sipser [GS] , there is an A r t h u r -M e r l i n protocol, ( M H A ) , for the same language, L. In ( M * A ) , Arthur sends only his coin flips, SO Arthur needn't understand the messages he's received in order to respond.
The second problem-that Arthur can't tell whether or. not he ought accept-is answered [GMWl] , all of NP can be proven in zero-knowledge, there is a way for Merlin to convince Arthur of the validitity of this statement t h a t is in zero-knowledge. The construction just given has the following defect:
To show that ( M -A ) is a zero-knowledge proof system for L, we need to argue that a n y A* learns essentially nothing by interacting with M. Suppose A' cheats by flipping a biased coin in place of his random tape, with bias, say, p = 3/4. If A' several times interacts with on a common input z E I), and if M usually convinces A* to accept, then, intuitively, A' has learned something: that most strings taken from this distribution lead to accepting I when used for A's random coins. This is "real knowledge," for it is entirely possible that even though hf usually convinces A to accept if A uses a fair coin, n/f usually fails to convince A to accept if A uses a 3/4-biased coin.
(If we tried to prove t h a t M is zero-knowledge, here's where we'd get stuck. T h e simulator MA* simulates the behavior of a "virtual prover," I", interacting with A*. On common input z E L, P* sends random encryptions of the appropriate length string of 0's. When this phase of the interaction is finished, we append a simulated proof that Arthur would accept if he correctly guessed d r , d z , . . .. B u t it is not always appropriate to append this simulated proof! For in the real interaction, (M c-, A*), A* sometimes rejects strings in L. Quite possibly, A* has chosen a distribution of strings for which A would wually reject strings in L. So if Pa always appends the simulated proof that Arthur would accept, the resulting view may significantly differ from the real view of the interaction. But P" has no way t o know if it ought or ought not send the simulated proof.)
One possible fix is to use the result of Goldreich, Mansour, and Sipser (GMS] , which says that we may, without loss of generality, take ( M * A) to be one-sided. That is, we may w u m e that regardless of t h e coins that A employs on I E L, A will be convinced t o accept I. (Consequently, it will always be appropriate for P* t o convince A' to accept in the simulated interaction.) This is t h e course t h a t we shall follow.
Another possible fix is to use a "coin flip into the well" for A's coins ( [Bl] ). To make this proposal work, it is necessary that the coin flips that are agreed to are statistically indistinguishable space R, which A' has some influence over. In any case, requiring a public key cryptosystem is a stronger assumption than t h e commitment scheme E ( m g , rand) t h a t we require.
Preliminaxies

Interactive proof systems
The definition we give for an interactive proof system is essentially that of Goldwaaser, Micali, v is polynomidy time-bounded. This means that there is a polynomial p for which, on inputs of length n, v experiences at most p ( n ) state transitions before it accepts or rejects. v does not transition when it is quiescent, and P is running. p is finite expected time. This means that there is a function f such that, on inputs of length n, P's expected computation time from start to quiescent states does not exceed f(n), regardless of the messages P has received. There is a polynomial r such that P never writes more than r ( n ) characters (including blanks) on t h e communication tape when the common input is of length n. If p and v are given random tapes Q,T E C", respectively, and are then run on input 5 E c', with work tapes initially empty, then the final state that V enters is well-defined, and we say that (P-* V,)(z) accepb or rejects accordingly. If we omit mention of u and 7, then we may speak of the "probability t h a t ( P + + V ) ( z ) accepts," P r [ ( P w V ) ( z ) accepts].
Definition. (P* V) is an interactive proof system for the language L if, for some 0 5 E < 1/2, we have both: The number E in this definition is called the error probability. By the standard method of running the protocol multiple times, we may take the error probability t o be any constant in ( O , l ) -o r even any error probability of the form e(n) = 2 -9 ( " ) , where p is a polynomial. In order to extend our discussion to speak of knowledge, we consider the possibility that V's work tape initially contains %ome knowledge." Suppose P and I/ are given random tapes O , T E c", respectively, and are run on input z E C*, with s E C' initially placed on V'S work tape. Then not only is t h e final state of V well-defined, but so are:
The number of rounds, 2m, for which P and V interact. (The number of rounds is the number of messages sent between A and B.) 0 The i t h message sent from V to P, zi. (A message is a prefix of the communication tape, from its left end to the first blank).
b The i t h message sent from P to V , yi.
That is, (p, V,O, T, 5 , S ) determine the number m and strings 2'= 11;. . . ; I=;, y = y i ; . . . ; ym;, as above. We define from these the public history of the interaction and the view of the interaction:
Interpret the right hand side of each of these definitions as the binary encoding of the specified string, where '[I, I;' and I,' are new (formal) symbols.
Informally, the public history is t h e interaction as it would be observed from t h e "outside;" the view is the interaction as seen from V's perspective. If we omit mention of Q and T , then (P V)(z, s) and (P yicu! V ) ( z , s) are probability V) and ( P * V) (no mention of z or s) are families of probability spaces.
spaces. (P
Arthur-Merlin protocols
In the definition for an interactive proof, the verifier was not compelled to reveal his coins flips (the prefix-of his random tape that he uses) to the prover. If the verifier does reveal his coin flips at each round, there is no reason for him to send anything else, since the prover himself could as well compute anything else the verifier would have sent. A seemingly weaker notion of an interactive proof, introduced by Babai [Baj [BaM] , is obtained by limiting the verifier's messages in this way.
Definition. An interactive proof for L, (M w A), is an Arthur-Merlin protocol if for some polynomials T and I, any interaction between M and A on an input of length n takes exactly r ( n ) rounds, each message sent being of length Z(n). Moreover, the r(n) messages sent by A,
are precisely the prefix TO = 11 . . . zr(n) of A's random tape that A consumes.
The first condition alone is easily seen not to weaken the model from that of a n interactive proof system. Surprisingly, the second condition does not weaken the model either:
Theorem 2.1. If (P w V) is an interactive proof system for L, then there is a one-sided,
The result without "one-sided" is due to Goldwasser and Sipser [GS] ; it was extended to proofs of perfect completeness by Goldreich, Mansour, and Sipser [GMS] . Recently, J. Kilian [K] discovered a much simpler argument for Theorem 2.1.
Zero-knowledge
c, E c' (n E N), C = {C,,} is a poly-size famiIy of circuits if there are polynomials p and p such that Ic,( 5 p(n), and C, encodes (via some fixed universal Turing machine) a (deterministic) algorithm which, on input x E C', requires at most q( 1 . 1 ) steps before it outputs a bit, 0 or 1.
If c is an algorithm that outputs a bit, and R is a probability space, then we may speak of "the probability t h a t C outputs a 1 on input drawn from R," p g = zPEC. P T R ( {~} )
We define zero-knowledge in terms of families of probability spaces indexed by two variables, which are treated differently.
Deflnition. Let R = {R(z,s)} and S = {S(z,s)} be families of probability spaces, indexed by c' X C' . Then R and S are indistinguishable over L if, for any poly-size family of circuits {cn}, any polynomial q, and all sufficiently long x in L, for all s E C ' . If R and S are indistinguishable over L, we write R Z L S to denote this. Deflnition. P is zero-knowledge over L if, for any V, there exists an expected polynomial-time
Definition. (P * V) is a zero-knowledge interactive proof system for L if (P t+ V) is an interactive proof system for L, and P is zero-knowledge over L.
We have defined indistinguishability with respect to poly-size families of circuits. In the proof of the main theorem, it will be convenient to think of indistinguishability with respect to poly-size families of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. As with circuits, this is a nonunifom concept; there may be no algorithm which, on input n, outputs the expected poly-time algorithm c,. By a n averaging argument, and exploiting nonuniformity, it is easy to see that the notion of indistinguishability is unchanged if we define indistinguishability with respect to poly-size families of circuits, or with respect to poly-size families of probabilistic polynomial time probabilistic algorithms.
Preliminary results
It is frequently convenient to assume that, when P and V interact, the interaction takes place for a fixed number of rounds, messages are of a fixed length, and V uses a fixed number of coin flips per round. T h e following proposition says that there is no loss of generality in making these assumptions. The proof is straightforward and has been omitted. Proposition 2.2. If (P c--) v) is a (zero-knowledge) (one-sided zero-knowledge) interactive proof system for L, then there exists an I", V', and polynomials T , I, t, such that (f" t+ v') is a (zero-knowledge) (one-sided zero-knowledge) interactive proof system for L, and on each input of length n, the interaction runs for exactly r ( n ) rounds, each message exchanged of length l(n), 0 and v' ffipping precisely t(n) coins for each message that it sends.
With respect to language recognition, we may further assume that the prover is deterministic. This observation (actually, t h a t PSFACE was enough for the prover), was first m a d e by Feldman [Fe] . Proposition 2.3. I f ( P t) V ) is an interactive proof system for L, then there is a deterministic P' for which (P' H V ) is an interactive proof system for L. If (P H V ) was an Arthur-Merlin
The next proposition depends on the fact that the "composition" of zero-knowledge interactive proofs remains zero-knowledge. A proof of Proposition 2.4 can be found in the paper of Tompa and Woll [TW] .
Proposition 2.4. If L admits a (one-sided) zero-knowledge interactive proof, then L admits a (one-sided) zero-knowledge interactive proof with error probability E for any 0 < e 5 1/2. R(z,s) = (Pz 0 9 * W)(Z,S) c a n be viewed as the probability space associated with the following experiment:
[ z , s , q l l + Ml(G8).
[z, s,72, ~2 ) to obtain a circuit which distinguishes (Pz H Vz)(z, sz) from M~( z , sz) by a t least 1/(2q(lZl).
The existence of the family of circuits modified as specified here contradicts (Pz H vz)(., -)
Case 2, when (2) holds infinitely often, is handled analogously.
M d . , .).
For completeness, we state t h e following trivial proposition:
Secure probabilistic encryption
The prover in our protocol will need the ability to securely commit a bit, and to convincingly decommit it. We formalize this by saying that a secwe probabilistic encryption s c h e m e is a function E : C x C' + C ' such t h a t (1) E is computable in polynomial time.
(2) Unique decryption: E ( P , s ) = E(P',y) implies p = 3'.
(3) Let En(P) be t h e probability space obtained by setting P r ( y ) = 2-" I{z E c" :
We require t h a t for any poly-size family of circuits C = {C,,}, for any polynomial q, and for all sufficiently large n, (Recall p g is the probability t h a t circuit C outputs 1 on input drawn from R. Note that to achieve t h e unique decryption condition with conventional encryption schemes, "certified primes" must be used [GK] [AH].) We write {E,(O)} =N {E,(l)} to denote the security condition.
Without loss of generality, there is a polynomial q such that IE(p,z)I = q(1~1) for all x E C'.
To encrypt a bit /3 with security parameter n, select a random n-bit string I and send E(P, z). To decommit, reveal z. T h e unique decryption condition makes it impossible that the commited bit could b e 1 -p. Also, from x and E(P, x) one can easily compute p.
To encrypt a string m = . . . pc with security parameter n, send E(P1, ~1 ) . . . E(PL, Z t ) for random n-bit strings 51,. . . , zl. T h e encryption will be denoted E,, (m, z) , where z = 5 1 . . . z , , and the corresponding probability space is denoted En(m). poly-size circuit family can predict b ( x ) given f(z) by better than 1/2 + n-', for any constant C. Given such f' and b, E as we have described it can readily be constructed.) Lemma 2.7. Assume the existence of a secure probabilistic encryption scheme. Let {yn} be a collection of strings, where ly,( = l(n), for some nonconstant poIynornial I . Then
The crucial property we need of a secure probabilistic encryption scheme is t h e following:
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there is a poly-size family C = {C,} and a polynomiai q such that for infinitely many n E N. Pick a particular n for which this holds. Define the strings !/;, for 0 5 j < I(n), such t h a t
1
Note that y i and y ; + ' agree at all positions except the.(j + 1)-st where y i is 1 and yi+;+' is 0.
Consequently, we may hardwire into c, the values of at each position except the ( j -I-1)-st, t o obtain a coin-flipping circuit which distinguishes encyptions of 0 from encryptions of 1 by at least 1/ ( I(n)q(n) ). Converting to a deterministic circuit, we contradict condition (3) about our encryption scheme. 0 2.6. Zero-knowledge proofs for all of N P
The following lemma and theorem are due t o Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMWl] . The proof of the first of these is omitted.
L e m m a 2.8. If secure probabilistic encryption is possible, then the language of (encodings of) 3-colorable graphs admits a (one-sided) zero-knowledge interactive proof.
0
Theorem 2.9. If secure probabilistic encryption is possible, then any language in NP possesses a (one-sided) zero-knowledge interactive proof.
Proof: Take L E N P , and let M be a nondeterministic Turing machine for L. Fix a canonical transformation Q t h a t takes any (M, x) (the encoding of a nondeterministic Turing machine and an input X ) to a graphs G. Q is poly-time computable, and has the property that M accepts 2 iff Q(M, S ) is 3-colorable.
TO prove z E L = L ( M ) in zerc-knowledge, both the prover and the verifier compute the graph G = v ( M , x), and engage in a zero-knowledge interactive proof (using Lemma 2.8) that G is 3-colorable.
Proof of the main theorem
We now prove the main theorem'of this paper: Theorem 3.1. Assuming a secure probabilistic encryption scheme exists, every language that admits an interactive proof admits a zero-knowledge interactive proof.
Proof: Suppose L admits an interactive proof. Then, by Theorem 2.1, L admits a one-sided, Arthur-Merlin interactive proof (M H A). By Proposition 2.3, M may be assumed to be deterministic. By Proposition 2.4, we may take the error probability of ( M t+ A) to be less than l/5.
By Proposition 2.2, (&I-A) may be assumed t o always use ~( n )
rounds, each message of length I(n), when M and A interact with common input z of length n. ( r and I are polynomials.)
we will construct from M and A a zero-knowledge, one-sided interactive proof system
Suppose Arthur's random tape contains a given infinite string. On input z of length n, Arthur only uses the (I(n).r(n))-bit prefix of this string, $ 1 .. That is, the protocol runs in two phases. In the first phase, if P and v share input 2 of length n, then on round i, when Merlin "would have" sent to Arthur the string y i , P instead randomly selects a n nZ(n)-bit string d; and sends to V the string Q ; = E n ( y i , d i ) . For t h e second phase, after all r ( n ) rounds of t h e first phase are completed, the prover decides whether or not
A would have accepted t h e corresponding unencrypted conversation, a fact which P can easily discern using PA. If A would have accepted, then P convinces V that A would have accepted.
That is, P convinces V of the validity of the NP-assertion . . ,yrnj1. P convinces V of this assertion by computing a graph G which is 3-colorable if and only if the preceding assertion holds, and then convincing V that G is 3-colorable using t h e method of [GMWl] . Enough rounds are used in this protocol t o convince V that G is 3-colorable with probability at least 4/5. Note G can be computed by a deterministic poly(n) time algorithm, p, so both P and V "know" G after the first r ( n ) interactions.
Let cp be t h e canonical map (appears in the proof of Theorem 2.9) that takes a tuple (2, Z I , , . . , ZT(,,), al, . . . ,a,.(,,) ) to a g r a p h G which is 3-colorable iff there is a guess y1,. . . , Yr(n), d l , . . . , dr(,,) for which a , = E ( y i , d i ) and A would accept the corresponding unencrypted conversation according to PA. We may assume that IE(G)I is always a power of 2. Though we include details of Phase 2 for completeness, it can be viewed as a black box that accepts t h e public conversation with error probability < 1/5 whenever M would have accepted the corresponding unencrypted conversation.
Protocol for the prover, P (on input z of len&h n)
If z 6 L, all messages to t h e verifier are A. Otherwise . . .
On rounds 15 i 5 t ( n ) :
-Wait to receive a message zi from the verifier.
-If lZil # l(n), dl future messages to the verifier are A. Otherwise . . .
. . , z i ) .
-Randomly select di E En'(").
-Send (~i = En(y;, d i ) to t h e verifier.
-Compute t h e graph G = p (z, 21,. . . ,z,.(,), C Y~, . . . , a r ( n ) 
-Compute a random (proper, vertex) 3-coloring of G, 0, : V ( G ) + {01,10,11}.
-Receive a n edge { j , k} from the verifier.
-Send (q-', 4-l) to t h e verifier.
-Select a random 3-coloring of G, Bi.
-Randomly select d; , . . . , d i E C2". Protocol for the verifier, V (on input x of length n)
On round 1: PHASE 1 ... -&ad off first l(n) bits of random tape into 2,.
-Send xi to the prover.
-Receive cri-1 from t h e prover.
-&ad off next l(n) bits of random tape into T,.
-Send x; t o the prover.
-Receive a,(,) from the prover.
-Send A to the prover.
On rounds 2 5 i 5 r(n):
On round z = r ( n ) + 1: PHASE 2 . . . ( z , z I , . . . ,zr(,,),al,. ..,a,(,,)) , V ( G ) = {I,. . . ,v}.
-Receive (a; , . . . , a:) from the prover.
-If not of this form, reject.
-Randomly select a n edge {j, k} E E ( G ) .
-Send ( j , k } to t h e prover.
-Receive ($-I, di-') from the prover.
-If not of this form, or if it is not the case that for distinct u , u E {01,10,11} is For rounds i + r ( n ) + 3 to r ( n ) + 3 + 2m:
-Receive a;, . . . , at from t h e prover.
-Randomly select { j , k} E E(G), and send {j, k} t o the prover.
accept.
We have three things to check: that V accepts all strings in L; that v usually rejects strings not in L, even if P is replaced by some other probabilistic algorithm; and t h a t P is zero-knowledge over 1;.
The first two of these claims are easy. Choose z E L, where /TI = n. Then for any strings XI,. . . , rr(") E c'("), we know that A interacting with M would accept when A sends messages (XI,. . . ,zr(,,)). Since t h e interactive proof for graph 3-colorability is one-sided, P will always always be able t o convince V t h a t A would accept (x, 5 1 , . . . ,z,(,), a1,. . . , ar(,)) if A knew the corresponding endcyption keys. So, in fact, we retain perfect completeness.
Suppose v is interacting with a corrupt prover, P', and the common input is Z , a string of length n, where I $ ! L. T h e probability that V will accept a string which A would not have accepted when given t h e corresponding unencrypted messages is at most 1/5. But for any x # L, A accepts with probability a t most 1/5. Thus V fallaciously accepts T with probability a t most 215, so the proof system is sound.
we now show that P is zereknowledge over L. By L e m m a 2.5, if we prove that P is zero-knowledge for t h e first phase of the interaction, we will be done: the whole interartion is the composition of ( P c+ v) restricted to the first phase, with (P H v) restricted to the second phase, and the second phase is zero-knowledge over the output of the first phase.
Let Pi be t h e protocol that carries out the first phase of the interaction. Inquiries beyond the r(n)-th are answered with the empty string.
Let w be a probabilistic poly-time algorithm that interacts with Pi. We may assume that W flips exactly t ( n ) coins on each round, where t is a polynomial, and n is the length of the common input.
We may assume t h a t (PI ci W ) always uses exactly r ( n ) rounds, each message of length l(n), when the common input is of length n. M w simulates a Kvirtual prover," Pl, interacting with W. M w uses its coins at odd positions for Pi's coins, and its coins at even positions for W's coins. M w , after simulating the interaction, outputs the view of this interaction. Note that M w is polynomial time.
Here is the protocol for $1:
On rounds 1 5 i 5 r(n):
-Wait t o receive a message 5; from the verifier.
-If I~i l # [(n), all future messages are A. Otherwise . , . -Randomly select di E En'(").
-Send E, (O'("), d;) to the verifier.
-Send A to t h e verifier.
On future rounds:
We argue that (Pi ++W)(., .) EL Mw(., .). The auxiliary string plays no role in the proof (other than to be given t o W), so we omit further mention of it. Denote the space (PI -W)(Z) by S'r(lzl), and hfw(x) by &(x). Assume for contradiction that these families of spaces are computationally distinguishable over L. That is, there exists a polynomial size family of circuits C ! = { c, } and a polynomial h such that for infinitely many x in L.
A "probability watk" is now used. Let Sj(s) be the probability space obtained by using the real prover, pi, for the first j rounds with V , and the virtual prover, for the remaining rounds. That is, sj(x) is the probability space defined by the interaction between w and the following prover, Pi. -Send A t o the verifier.
On future rounds:
Observe that this agrees with our previous definition of So(s) and S,(I~D(Z), and that the defining algorithms for s,(x) and s,+l(x) differ in behavior only on the ( j + 1 ) -s t round, at which point s, uses pi while S,+l uses P I .
By the triangle inequality, there are infinitely many z in L for which there is a n associated i, 0 5 i < r ( I z l ) , such t h a t Using c, we construct a poly-size family of expected polynomial time algorithms, c' = {CL}, and an infinite collection of strings {z,}, Iz,I = Z(n), such that CA effectively distinguishes the probability space En(%,) from t h e probability space E, (O'(") ).
Choose I E L , 111 = n, and z, for which the bound in (1) holds. We show how to modify C , to obtain c;. Let where E , 2 1 / r ( n ) h ( n ) .
Consider the first i + 1 rounds between a prover and W . An f(n) = (i + l)t(n)-bit prefix, and (3) the string y;+1 t h a t t h e prover will next encrypt and send to W (recall t h a t t h e prover is deterministic on each round u p to the point at which it encrypts). Now, by t h e triangle inequality, so there is a particular u E Cf(,) which achieves Fix such a Q. For this u, the prover induces a certain distribution on the first z messages
, where q(n) is the number of bits needed to encrypt a bit under E. Let A, be the probability that the prover's f i r s t i messages will be a, A, = 1. Define S"'"(X) as the probability space obtained by having . . . , ( x~( , ) , Q , J , ) ) ) , together with associated coin flips for W (which is u with some random ( t ( n ) ( r ( n ) -z -1)-bit string appended). Ck constructs the associated view of the conversation, and feeds this t o c, to obtain a bit, 0 or 1. Ck outputs this bit.
The poly(n) length of Q and u guarantees that CL is expected polynomial time. And by our construction.
Set 2, = y;+l. T h e family of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms C' = {c:} (indexed by the same infinite set of naturals as in (1)) so constructed constitutes a poly-size family of probabilistic polynomial algorithms that distinguishes {(En(zn)} from { (E,(O'(R))} by at least en. By our remark t h a t distinguishability by polynomial size families of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms implies distinguishability by poly-size families of circuits, we have contradicted Lemma 2.7. Our original assumption-that (PI H W ) is distinguishable from Mw-is therefore in error.
That P itself is zero-knowledge follows from Lemma 2.5. The second phase of the interaction depends only on the public history of the first phase of the interaction. Recall that, by one-sidedness, whenever 5 E L, A would accept when interacting with M , so the graph G generated following the interaction will always be 3-colorable. Since the second phase of the interaction is precisely the graph-isomorphism protocol applied to a deterministic poly-time computable function of the public history, Lemmas 2.8 and 2.6 tell us that the second phase of the interaction is zero-knowledge over t h e possible public histories.
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Notarized Envelopes: Description and Implement ation
The interactive proof that a graph is 3-colorable ( [GMWl] ) can be implemented in perfect zero-knowledge using envelopes for committing strings. For each vertex, the prover puts into a vertex-labeled envelope a slip of paper giving the color of that vertex. These envelopes are placed before the verifier. T h e verifier chooses an edge and the prover allows the verifier to open the envelopes for the edge's endpoints. As a consequence of this protocol, all of NP can be implemented with envelopes in perfect zero-knowledge.
It is natural to ask if every language in IP can be proven in zero-knowledge using envelopes for commitment. T h e proof of the preceding section does not immediately give a solution t o this problem. In this section, we answer this question in the affirmative.
Introduction t o notarized envelopes-
We now consider a stronger type of commitment scheme, known as notarized envelopes. Notarized envelopes allow one to commit and decommit a sequence of bits, b l , . . . , b,, just as with ordinary envelopes. However, with notarized envelopes one can additionally prove any single N p assertion, P(b1,. . . , bn), during or after the commital stage. In our implementation using ordinary envelopes, this proof is in perfect zero-knowledge. If P(b1,. . . , b,) does not hold (or a poly-time bounded commitor does not have a witness of this fact), then the verifier will reject with probability at least l/nc, where c is a constant which depending on P. This probability may be amplified arbitrarily by standard techniques.
A notarized envelope scheme may be thought of as a set of three protocols: A commital protocol, a decommital protocol, and a zero-knowledge proof protocol. Nearly all of t h e complexity of our implementation comes from the zero-knowledge protocol.
An implementation of notarized envelopes
Our reduction from notarized envelopes to ordinary envelopes is essentially a simplified version of Kilian's reduction from notarized envelopes (or, in his terminology, commital with teroknow ledge pfoofs) to oblivious transfer( [Kl] ). However, our protocol has somewhat different properties from Kilian's, due t o the fact that we are using envelopes instead of oblivious transfer. Using oblivious transfer, one can noninteractively commit bits with zero-knowledge proofs. Our scheme requires a constant number of rounds of interaction. It is not hard to show t h a t a n y implementation based on ordinary envelopes must have some interaction, so our solution is optimal up to constant factors. Also, our implementation achieves perfect zero-knowledge, whereas Kilian's only achieves statistical zero-knowledge.
Commital and Decommital
We first present our protocols for committing and decommitting a set of bits, b l , . . . , b,. In our protocols, we adopt t h e convention that Alice commits the bits, and Bob acts as the verifier. 
Zero-knowledge Proofs
w e first use the simple observation t h a t it suffices to consider predicates, P, which are in NC' ([Kl] ).
Furthermore, given an NC' predicate, P(b1,. . . , b,.,), the predicate P'(z1,. . . ,zzn) defined by Our implementation of zero-knowledge proofs is somewhat more complicated.
~' ( z I , -* . 1 t 2 n ) = P ( z l e zn+l,-. . ,zn @ ~n ) , will also be in NC'. Now, if P'(z1,. . . ,Q,) is in NC', then by a theorem of Barrington [Bal, there is a polynomial sized width 5 permutation branching programs (W5PBP) for P'.
A branching program B may be thought of a a sequence of triples, n RJbiJ = { ;
Here, I represents t h e identity element for S g . Given an NC' circuit for P', Barrington shows how t o construct a canonical branching program which realizes P', which we denote by Bpi.
We can now describe our protocol for giving zero-knowledge proofs of some NC' predicate, 
P. We assume t h a t
i = l i=l
Furthermore, it is not hard to show that if R1,. . . , Rm-l are distributed uniformly, then the sequence B1,. . . , Bm will be distributed uniformly over all sequences with the given product.
We claim t h a t this protocol constitutes a perfect zero-knowledge proof system for P. First we show that this is indeed a proof system. (b) will detect this fact with probability at least l / m . If equality (3) does not hold, then test (c) will detect this fact with probability at least l/m. Since each test will be invoked with probability 1/3, t h e lemma follows.
0
It is not hard to see t h a t our protocol achieves perfect zero-knowledge. Bob is only allowed to make a single test, either (a), (b), or (c). If he makes test (a), all he sees is a random sequence of elements whose product is a. Tests (b) and (c) allow Alice to get information about Z i j , for some value of i. However, this will give him no information about any of the bits b i , since each is represented as an exclusive-or of two of the xi's.
IP in perfect zero-knowledge with envelopes
The notarized envelope scheme just described gives us zerclknowledge proofs for all of I P Theorem 4.2. Assuming envelopes for bit commitment, every language that admits an interactive proof admits a perfect zero-knowledge interactive proof.
